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ABSTRACT
Private uses of prison labor are illegal internationally, and not without reason. A lack of public
oversight and regulations of wages mean that prison labor is often exploited in exchange for
increased profitability for private prisons and sometimes the private companies they contract
with. This paper will explicate the ways in which private uses of prison labor contribute to wage
and employment precarity and ultimately cost numerous non incarcerated low wage individuals
in the United States their jobs and livelihoods. It offers potential policy solutions and paths
forward for new research to better link the sociological and economic considerations of this
issue.
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Introduction
Ethical consumption is an ever increasing trend in modern consumerism in the United
States. Movements towards fair trade or local production are wide sweeping, and boycotts of
companies found to use unethical sources of labor abroad are increasingly common. However,
what many do not realize is the extent to which the goods they utilize on a daily basis are made
through unethical practices. Supply chains are necessarily muddled by the global economy, and
truly tracking where products come from is difficult in an ever globalizing world. For some, this
creates a drive towards domestically produced products, as there is an expectation that goods
produced in the United States are held to higher standards and contribute to job growth at home.
What many individuals fail to account for in this ethical comparison is the substantial amount of
prison labor used in the production of domestic goods.
The United States is five percent of the global population, yet holds nearly twenty percent
of the world’s prison population, meaning that one in five incarcerated individuals in the world
are in the United States.1 There are 2.2 million individuals currently incarcerated, representing a
near doubling since the 1990s and a quadrupling since the 1980s, largely as a result of the war on
drugs.2 Ten percent of these inmates are incarcerated in private prisons, or prisons that are
independently owned and operated and who contract with the United States federal and state
governments.3 The United States largely expanded into privately contracted prison labor around
the same time incarceration was increasing and private prisons were first being introduced.4
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Incarceration at such a large scale was expensive, and inmate labor and private prisons were
considered ways that the government could offset increasing costs.5
The effects of this expansion was the advent of the prison industrial complex, a system of
private actors who systematically were able to profit off of the existence of private prisons
themselves as well as the contracted labor incarcerated individuals performed.6 As a result,
prisoners have been tasked with producing goods and services for a myriad of private companies
including AT&T, Boeing, Revlon, Starbucks, Eddie Bauer, Target, McDonalds, Microsoft,
Nordstrom, Kmart, JC Penny, Toys ‘R’ Us and many more companies.7 Many U.S. individuals
have likely purchased goods made by prisoners, have talked on the phone with call centers
staffed by prisoners, or have eaten produce prisoners have grown completely unknowingly.8
What is the most troubling is that this labor is largely unregulated and unpaid or underpaid.
Inmates generally receive substantially less than minimum wage for a day’s labor, and some of
that money may be withheld by the state in order to cover incarceration costs, meaning in some
cases incarcerated individuals may make less than $1 an hour for their labor.9 There are also
fairly low if any regulations within private prisons, with few hourly maximums, no sick or other
time off, no workplace safety federal oversight, and the potential for loss of privileges such as
visitation rights if prisoners refuse to work. In some states, prisoners who refuse to work can
even face solitary confinement as a punishment.10
Private prison labor’s general lack of regulation as well as the remarkably low wages
prisoners are paid make it very easy to exploit. Minimum wage, forty hour weeks, full benefits
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packages, overtime, and the costs of maintaining work sites are all non-existent when a private
company chooses to contract with prison labor instead.11 This necessarily makes prison labor the
logical choice for many companies looking to cut labor costs in an ever globalizing world.
Menial labor pushed on to prisoner’s being paid low wages as opposed to workers that are not
incarcerated and making minimum wage substantially shift job markets and jobs away from
those low wage workers. For example, once Victoria’s secret can shift sewing jobs out of
minimum wage paying factories and into private prisons, they are able to produce substantially
more for much less with the added bonus of not having to do nearly as much due diligence on
workplace safety regulations, provide benefits, or even supervise labor in many instances. At the
same time, US corporations who choose to use private prison labor domestically get the benefit
of sales increases from being able to say “made in the USA” as well as breaks in transportation
costs and fees for bringing products made abroad back to the United States to assemble, package
or sell.
Furthermore, this labor, in many ways is self-propagating. The prison will replicate itself
as long as it is profitable. Private prisons save the United States substantial amounts of money
housing and feeding incarcerated individuals.12 America is constructing new prisons at
substantial rate, because they are no longer just a function of the state to dissuade crime and to
protect the public: they are a business, and a profitable one at that. What is really at stake here is
the propagation and profiting of prisons at the expense of low wage workers. This paper will
argue that private prisons and companies alike are able to utilize prison labor for economic and
political benefit, causing increases in labor precarity for non-incarcerated low wage American
workers.
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A Review of the Literature
This literature review is a broad discussion of the current state of prison labor in private
institutions, an analysis of wage precarity and insecurity in the United States, and a legal analysis
of the International Labor Organization’s Convention on Forced Labour. There have not been
many substantive studies involving all three subfields, however they are all intrinsically related.
Prison labor in private institutions is not only prohibited by international law, but prohibited
specifically because of its potential effects on the free market. Many scholars believe that prison
labor contributes to wage precarity as incarcerated individuals work for inadequate wages that
allow private corporations to potentially monopolize markets. Essentially, when corporations are
able to pay incarcerated workers less than minimum wage, it creates unfair competition for nonincarcerated lower waged labor forces. This literature review is an exploration of the ways in
which these three fields are interrelated in order to better explicate the ways prison labor may
contribute to labor precarity.
Private Prison Labor in the United States
The modern state of private prison labor in the United States is substantial, at times
harmful, and has been justified throughout American history in a myriad of different ways.
Private prisons can be defined as “for profit businesses that build and/or manage prisons for
local, state, and federal governments.13” The majority of inmates housed in modern private
prisons are managed by two corporations, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and
the GEO Group. These prisons operate either on a contract basis by managing existing public
facilities, or through independent facilities built, managed, and run by the private entities
themselves.14 They house thousands of inmates combined, with the most recent Department of
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Justice data suggesting that 130,941 inmates were being held in private prisons in 2011, an
increase of nearly double over the ten years the data was taken.15 Data also suggests that private
prisons are highly profitable, with annual revenues of the two corporations in 2010 surpassing
$2.9 billion.16 This increase in population over time is of particular relevance, especially when
considering the profit motive these private corporations likely have. The first section of the
literature review explores the historical and modern justifications for private prisons, creating an
understanding of their prevalence throughout American history, as well as analyze the ways in
which wages, treatment, and standards are maintained within private prisons.
Public to Private Prison Labour- The Historical Perspective
Throughout American history, there has been much consensus among academics that
there is some benefit to prison labor. William Quigley (2004) argues that there are “moral, just,
family, and practical reasons to offer work opportunities [to prisoners].” 17 He notes that in the
1800s that many thought labor in prisons was beneficial because it taught prisoners life skills and
could have some reformatory benefit—a sentiment that continues to this day.18 However,
Quigley argues that prison privatization had some effect on these attitudes. He writes: “Within a
few decades, however, the motive to make money emerged as the primary goal of prison labor
and the privatization systems of contract convict labor and convict leasing became the dominant
models...”19 It became clear that public awareness about how private models of prisons had
disadvantages distinct from public institutions was on the rise. Cox and Meiners (2001) argue
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that as it became apparent that private prisons were profit driven, opposition grew in the form of
businesses and trade unions.20 Quigley furthers this argument, writing that competition with low
wage labor, as well as heightened manufacturing costs were key concerns for business owners.21
One weakness of both pieces is that they fail to discuss at length the human costs of these
privatized labor policies at any length. Undoubtedly there are consequences for incarcerated
individuals in private prisons as there are often no regulations of conditions, and they are subject
to being leased out to other private corporations for labor.22 Cox and Meiners do briefly mention
that convict labor was often wrought with “cruel treatment,” and later in the piece discuss
modern wage discrepancies among prisoners. Quigley continues that disapproval from
businesses and trade unions ultimately led to the decline of private prison labor as laws were
passed to prevent the interstate travel of goods produced by prisoners working for private firms.
He notes, however that along with the re-emergence and substantial growth of private prisons in
the 1980s (due in large part to the war on drugs substantially increasing prison populations) came
the Prison Industry Enhancement Act, which allowed private firms to resume contract work with
prisoners and ship goods across the country.23 It would seem that the historical justifications for
prison labor—both private and public—were substantial enough to overcome potential concerns,
and ultimately change policy within the United States over time.
Modern Justifications for Private Prison Labour
Today there are several justifications for the modern adoption of private prisons and the
labor that occurs within their walls. According to Donna Selman and Paul Leighton, in the 1980s
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and 90s there was substantial pressure on politicians from both private enterprises and the public
to adopt stances that were both tough on crime and less reliant on government.24 Consequently,
this period of time led to substantial growth in the incarcerated prison population.25 Alfred Aman
and Carol Greenhouse concur that tough on crime attitudes are what lead to prison overcrowding
during the 90s due to heightened penalties for non-violent drug offenders.26 Selman and Leighton
build on this line of reasoning, writing: “their solution, privatization, fit with the attack on the
government’s handling of public service, the fervent belief in the power of free markets, and the
dominant discourse suggesting that more incarceration was the only answer to the crime
problem.”27 Overcrowding, demand for less government involvement in all aspects, and tough on
crime attitudes have all been conceptualized as justifications for the re-emergence and growth of
the private prison industry.
Another justification for both private prisons and their labor is that it is simply cheaper
than public prisons. Quigley notes that this is a common rationale for the adoption of private
prisons, with several authors making the claim that public institutions are simply less efficient.28
However, several studies have indicated that the justification of efficiency is not sufficient: “a
2001 report under the auspices of the Bureau of Justice Assistance indicate that the cost
differential between private and public prisons is minimal.”29 Camp and Gaes posit that in cases
where costs prove to be minimal, savings may not come from the efficacy of the private
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institutions themselves, but rather the savings they get from paying lower wages (both to inmates
and guards), fewer staff, cheaper food, and many more factors.30 Both of these examples serve to
disprove the common narrative posited by Quigley.
Inmate Wages, Rights, and Standards Within Private Prisons
Prisoners definitionally do not have substantial rights while incarcerated. However there
are some ways which private prisons undermine these rights substantially more than public
institutions. Prisoners are generally required to work and often do so both with or without pay.31
Quigley argues that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires workers be paid a minimum
wage in the United States, is “silent as to the coverage of prison labor,” and that “prisoners have
no constitutional right to be paid at all for the work they are forced to perform.”32 However, the
matter of coverage under the act is contested when it comes to privately operated or contracted
facilities.33 Private prison inmates are not protected in any capacity as the Fair Labor Standards
Act does not contest how private employers manage inmate employees.34 One weakness of the
piece, however, is that the justification for how private and public prisoners are treated
differently under the Act are not substantially well developed. Atman and Greenhouse explain
that discrepancies in wages and conditions exist between private and public prisons:
“...government and private companies are held to different accountabilities and rationales; they
are also subject to different formulations of success.”35 For these reasons, Dolovich argues that
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outcomes of treatment also differ between the two.36 He further contends that guard training,
standards imposed, and inadequate investments are all factors in the different ways prisoner
outcomes might differ and potentially be worse for private company inmates.37 Cynthia Young
furthers Dolovich’s argument, noting that private prison labor operates outside of US
employment standards that have been fought for:
Prisoners cannot quit, call in sick, leave early, take vacation time, or earn a pension. They
are also exempt from daily work-hour maximums, so they often must work as long as the
employer wants. Refusal to work is punished by the revoking of privileges such as visits
from or calls to family members and access to the prison store. In California, if inmates
decline to work, they can even be moved to solitary confinement.38
Her argument bolsters that of Atman & Greenhouse who write that standards that government
institutions are held to are often ignored within the confines of private prisons.39 Occupational
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations, fair wages, and adequate worker
representation are difficult to find and rarely enforced within prisons in general, but to a
substantially larger extent in private prisons themselves.40 The utter lack of regulations and the
severity of working conditions are shocking, and essentially create a labor force unburdened by
regulations that seek to reduce the potential harms of employment.
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Precarious Employment & Prison Labor
The link between precarious employment and the utilization of prison labor has been
established to a limited extent in the literature, with authors arguing that prison labor has the
potential to create adverse outcomes to non-incarcerated individuals in precarious job positions.
Precarious labor is a somewhat ambiguous term, but which generally refers to the insecurity
many low wage workers face in their day to day lives due to the threat of joblessness. Sharryn
Kasmir defines precarity as denoting “a general, pervasive ontological condition of vulnerability,
displacement, and insecurity…”41 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics nearly 21.6
million employees work in precarious situations.42
Kang argues that laborer precarity and prison labor are intrinsically linked due to the
stresses that prison labor brings to the low wage market sphere.43 Kasmir concurs, writing
“Today, forced, bonded, and imprisoned laborers provide services and produce consumer goods,
while 1.6 million people live in multidimensional poverty…”44 Linus Nilsson also agrees with
this logic, citing the ways in which private prison companies can take advantage of the free
market through cheap labor: “…protects free workers market, and, if the prison produces goods
for sale on the open market, there is a problem with unfair competition. Businesses that comply
with fair conditions and standards at work cannot compete with prisons which do not pay for
their prisoner’s work.”45 As Cynthia Young argues, “why should corporations pay union-scale or
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living wages when they can pay pennies a day to inmates behind bars?”46 She expands on
Nilsson’s argument about working conditions by extrapolating that these conditions contribute to
corporate preferentialism. The lack of labor unions, limited hour work weeks, arbitration, OSHA
standards, and general benefits make prison labor substantially more attractive to companies
needing to source low wage unskilled jobs.47 According to economist Gordon Lafer, this is
because the very metric of a private prison relies on operating facilities for “less than what the
state pays them” and then, to turn a profit, “contract prisoners out to private enterprises” for low
wages.48 Many argue that this discrepancy in wages is the driving factor behind prison labor’s
impact on wage precarity in the United States. As one article argues, “...low wage prisoners
undermine competitive unskilled and semi-skilled labor markets and decrease living standards of
those who remain employed by reducing wage rates. Unskilled or semi-skilled laborers would be
the most at risk since most prison jobs are unskilled or semi-skilled.”49 In other words, if
unskilled and semi-skilled prisoners are able to do the same jobs for the same companies for
lower wages than non-incarcerated individuals, those non-incarcerated individuals are likely to
lose their jobs.50 Ultimately what this line of argumentation serves to prove from these authors is
that first, there is a precarious working class facing joblessness on an everyday basis; that prison
labor’s draw to private industry via low wages, to some extent contributes to precarity.
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Issues of International Legality of Private Prisons
International law surrounding the regulation of prison labor, and by extension prisoner
rights, is not substantially well developed. The primary international regulation surrounding
prison labor is the International Labor Organization Forced Labour Convention No. 29, which
was ratified in 1930 and explicates what types of labor qualify as forced or coerced. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) defines forced labour as “all work or service which is
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not
offered himself voluntarily.”51 Upon first glance the convention implies that prison labor, which
is often compulsory, qualifies as forced, and is therefore illegal labor.52 However, as Linus
Nilsson argues, prisoners are exempt from this definition as a later article within the convention
explicitly excludes prisoners and their labor from normative definitions of forced labor itself.53
Article two, section C explicates that prison labor is one condition that is exempt from being
considered forced labor:
Any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a court
of law, provided that the said work or service is carried out under the supervision and
control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired to or placed at the
disposal of private individuals, companies or associations[...].54
Most relevantly, this article makes the distinction between private and public forms of prison
labor and dictates that prisoners must carry out work under the “supervision and control” of a
public authority.55 Private prisons, and the labor that occurs within their walls are therefore
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necessarily in violation of ILO standards, as well as those public prisons that have labor
arrangements with private corporations.56
Textual Analysis of Convention 29
The nature of the International Labor Organization Convention on Forced Labour
indicates that there are significant constraints on private prisons and private enterprise within
prisons. These constraints mean that several states, including the United States, Australia, the
United Kingdom and many more are arguably in violation of international law. Susan Kang
writes: “The United States’ domestic policies not only contradict its foreign policies, but also
violate is international legal obligations. Specifically, they violate the International Labor
Organization’s Convention on the elimination of forced labor.”57 Also demonstrative of this
argument, Swepston argues is that America has failed to ratify convention 29, making it only one
of nine countries to do so.58 The lack of compliance on the part of states, and more specifically
the United States, is not substantially contested by most authors. However, attempts at
understanding the nature of violations are very present in the literature.
Convention 29 itself has undergone significant textual scrutiny with committees being
formed by the ILO over the years to establish what the best and most relevant interpretation of
the language of the convention is.59 However, many authors have slightly different
understandings of what the agreement actually says. Though “private enterprise” is fleshed out in
the convention as “private individuals, companies, or associations,” there is some dispute over
what the language actually means. Nilsson argues that private prisons are included in definitions
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of private enterprises and therefore “the supervision and control of a public authority also proves
to be problematic for privately owned prisons, since they are, by pure definition, not public.”60
What can be agreed upon is that the convention accomplishes two things in its language: it
creates a “distinction between private and public,” and “affords better protection to prisoners
working for private enterprise.”61
Justifications for the ILO Forced Labour Convention
The International Labor Organization faced difficulties when determining which forms of
prison labor to classify as forced. Kang argues that the normative justifications for prison labor
(such as labors rehabilitative effects and potential recidivism rate reductions) are what ultimately
persuaded the Organization to only prohibit explicitly private uses of prison labor.62 The ILO did
not fundamentally disagree that prison labor could be useful, both to states and to incarcerated
individuals.63 Though that is not to say that there was not substantial concern over the potential
consequences of allowing prison labor to be propagated by figures that were not the state.64
Milman-Sivan conceptualizes the justifications for Convention 29 as two separate schools of
thought: one being abuse of power arguments, the other being market based arguments. Abuse of
power arguments have to do with the potential for exploitation of prisoners as there is a tendency
for private actors to be profit seeking, rather than concerned about the well-being of prisoners in
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their care.65 Kang furthers this argument, indicating that instead of saving the state money,
private companies simply absorb profits gained through cheaper inmate labor.66
Unlike Kang, Milman-Sivan believes that the standard abuse of power justification is
ideologically weak, and often becomes a reduction to a type of moral shaming; profits will be
sought after, regardless of private or public affiliation.67 She cites market pressures as a
secondary set of justifications, calling it the “competition rationale.” Her argument essentially
states that private prison labor can contaminate the already public market that exists, therefore
making the potential for exploitation of the private prisoners an attractive idea.68 Nilsson expands
on this idea, stating that the convention “…protects free workers market, and, if the prison
produces goods for sale on the open market, there is a problem with unfair competition.
Businesses that comply with fair conditions and standards at work cannot compete with prisons
which do not pay the same for their prisoner’s work.”69 Kang seems to confer that this argument
is relevant, particularly on an international scale. She argues that a sort of “race to the bottom”
where states continuously lower wages to remain competitive, could be detrimental to the global
economy and to the rights of all workers beyond prisoners.70 In 1998, an ILO Conference
Committee discussing the ways in which Convention 29 standards should be applied seemed to
agree that there was a risk of Kang’s proposed race to the bottom. They argued that it was
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apparent that private prisons and companies could exploit prison labor through paying prisoners
wages far below the federal minimum.71 Kang’s work agrees with these ILO findings; she argues
that violation of Convention 29 has direct impacts on both domestic and international economies.
She writes that in the United States “the use of prison labor directly threatens job security,
wages, conditions, and the strength of unions.”72 Kang argues that justifications for this claim are
two-fold. First, international pressures through a normalized use of private prison labor drive all
wages down internationally. This same effect is then replicated domestically in the United States.
As deindustrialization has occurred and forced jobs abroad, “private actors’ access to prison
labor grants these companies access to a low-wage, disciplined labor force without the added
costs of overseas production.”73 This implies that beyond the pressures American labor faces
from offshoring, those remaining low wage, unskilled jobs are then filled by prisoners due to the
low wages corporations facing global pressures can get away with paying them.74 Her
argumentation is key as it frames wage precarity in the United States and abroad as intrinsically
linked to the increase of private prison labor in Western states.
Enforcement
Given arguments such as Kang’s that indicate the United States and potentially other
actors are in violation of Convention 29, many authors have attempted to understand why there
have been no consequences. Much debate boils down to a question as to the efficacy of the
enforcement mechanisms that the International Labor Organization possesses. Kang writes that
the ILO “does not have strong enforcement mechanisms,” and that there are no potential
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ramifications that serve as deterrents to state actions.75 Nilsson explains that the process of
enforcement involves states filing reports against one another, and those reports being brought to
the ILO. If there is no action taken at that point, the case goes to the International Court of
Justice for a ruling.76 Although, he notes that this rarely occurs due to a lack of reports being
followed, and due to state’s willingness to at least appear to acquiesce to the ILO.77
Extrapolating from the literature base it is therefore understandable that there have been few
ramifications for state’s failure to be held responsible for potentially violating international law.
Conclusions
The main findings of this review are that there are definite connections between private
prisons, wage precarity, and matters of international legality. The solidification of causal links
between wage precarity and specifically private prison labor, comprehensive data on the extent
and scope of prison labor after 2012, and data on prison labor’s impact are all lacking in the
current literature base. Further work could help to answer the questions posited by this paper
more comprehensively, however the information provided has allowed this literature review to
solidify its findings. It finds that there is relative consensus that private prison labor creates
unfair competition with laborers in the free market, as the low wages prisoners receive
necessarily corner markets. Additionally, it finds that conditions have the potential to be worse in
private institutions due to a myriad of factors. The third section on international legality heavily
suggests that the United States, among other states, may be in violation of international law.
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Case Studies
In researching worker precarity’s connection to private prison labor, it became apparent
that there had been very little data collected connecting the two in meaningful ways. Widespread
data about offshoring and immigration’s effects on labor in the United States were substantially
better developed, likely due to the normalization of those narratives as threats to jobs and the free
market. Substantive studies abroad, in other countries that also utilize private prison labor (New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada mainly) were also difficult to come by, and it
seemed as though private prison labor in those countries was less normalized than in the United
States.78 Comprehensive, national data was also not available in the context of the United States,
however, the existence of state level prisons yielded far more independent cases of prison labor
being documented as detrimental to non-incarcerated laborers.
There seemed to be only one empirical national level study of incarcerated labor’s effects
on the free market. Its methodology was to use a previous study on immigration’s logarithmic
equations, factoring in specific elasticities associated with prison labor. This methodology,
however, seemed suspect to me as there is little analysis or explanation as to why the authors feel
immigration is comparable enough to prison labor to use the same equations to study both. This
study found that prison labor did actually reduce employment levels, finding that “the 85,432
prisoners currently employed reduce free employment by between 33,503 and 51,254 jobs...”79
This seemingly confirms the hypothesis that prison labor contributes to labor precarity, however,
the authors of this study conclude that the market shock from prison labor is not substantially
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different from other shocks the market has already faced.80 Even in this case, which has
methodology that seems to be questionable, and is the only aggregate study, the empirical data
would seem to bolster the idea that job loss and precarity are caused to some degree by private
prison labor. This is significant because even if the author’s conclusions do not support the idea
that prison labor produces unique effects, their data would seem at a basal level to back this idea.
Case studies would seem to give substantially more insight into the ways prison labor
directly contributes to worker precarity, as there are dozens of examples of this link as opposed
to a singular empirical analysis. Qualitative analysis through a series of case studies should give
a more comprehensive idea of the scope of prison labor. Even if that scope is limited, as the
above study indicates it may be, it allows for a better understanding of the specific conditions
which lead to worker insecurity after private entities contract with prison labor. Knowing that
between 30 and 50 thousand jobs were lost during the period Derrick’s study analyzed is
important, however, understanding how those job losses occurred is important as well.81 The
case studies chosen here are two of numerous qualitative examples, however these were chosen
particularly for the quality of their documentation. Each of the two main case studies analyzed
here have been through legal proceedings regarding claims of infringement on the free market
and workers’ rights. Due to a lack of financial or legal resources, many of these cases,
particularly smaller ones, are not well documented and lack substantive data on their own, often
coming from very small news outlet stories. Therefore, in addition to the two case studies, an
analysis of smaller cases taken in conjunction with one another will be analyzed. These case
studies and their subsequent analysis should provide some degree of understanding of how wage
precarity and prison labor are more concretely interconnected.
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Tennessee: Tennier Industries
One of few well documented cases of private sector jobs being lost to prison labor is the
case of Tennier Industries, a Tennessee based clothing production company. Their contract was
initially with the Department of Defense to produce $45 million worth of textiles. However, they
ultimately lost their long held contract to the Federal Prison Industries (FPI) (a subsidiary of
UNICOR), a government owned corporation that works to contract prisoner’s labor.82 FPI was
able to quote higher production yields for lower costs as a result of the wages they were paying
their incarcerated employees. The average prisoner on this project was making between $0.23
and $1.15 per hour of labor compared to the federally mandated minimum wage of $7.25.83 After
losing their contract, Tennier had to lay off over 100 workers; 100 individuals who otherwise
would have had full time employment.84
Tennier filed a protest with the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) arguing
that the DOD violated a provision designed to allow small businesses in Historically
Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZone) to better compete for government contracts. 85 This
provision in theory allows for economic development in areas that have not historically been
strong business centers, and to reward small businesses for starting up in areas that need
economic stimulus.86 Tennier was one such small business.87 The GAO ultimately decided that
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the Federal Prison Industries were not required to adhere to HUBZone requirements and that no
statutes had been violated by FPI acquiring the contract.88 The GAO writes:
The agency received 9 proposals, including Tennier’s and FPI’s […] According to the
protester, allowing FPI to compete defeats the purpose of the Historically Underutilized
Business (HUBZone) Act of 1997 […] we conclude that DLA’s decision to permit FPI to
compete under the solicitation did not violate a procurement statute or regulation.89
Essentially, this decision is indicative of a much larger problem as it pertains to the legality of
competition. Government agencies are allowed to offer contracts to the lowest bidder (generally
FPI) as long as items acquired are comparable in “price, quality, and time of delivery.”90
However, the moment that they are not comparable in only one of those areas, agencies are
required to implement “fair opportunity” in competing contracts, thereby allowing the lowest
bidder to take the contract as long as the items produced are of comparable quality and time of
production and delivery.91 This particularity is what causes the most difficulties for companies
trying to compete with FPI. If prisoners are allowed to be paid substantially lower than minimum
wage for the same amount of labor, they are able to produce goods for FPI that are of the same
quality and time to produce, but are substantially cheaper.92 This disallows private sector
competition from the very start. It is even more difficult when government agencies are
“encouraged to purchase FPI supplies and services to the maximum extent practicable.”93
Ultimately, this occurs in dozens of cases where various government agencies are able to bypass
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contracting assistance policies designed to encourage economic growth. Instead, they focus
inwards on a pseudo public corporation that uses prison labor to minimize cost and ultimately to
make a profit.94 Furthermore, FPI itself actively acknowledges this truth, writing that they must
function as a business and make profits in order to sustain operations and to expand them to new
customers.95 They do however, fail to acknowledge the effects that profit seeking may have on
private sector employment. Tennier’s CFO, Steven Eisen, summarizes the frustrations his and
other private companies feel towards having to compete with FPI and other prisoner contracting
programs: “Our government screams, howls and yells how the rest of the world is using
prisoners or slave labor to manufacture items, and here we take the items right out of the mouths
of people who need it.”96 This case study ultimately creates some degree of understanding that
there are consequences to low wage laborers when prison labor is at play. Even in this example,
which demonstrates a public agency (the Department of Defense) seeking a contract in
circumstances were FPI has already been given preferential treatment in other deals, the cost
discrepancy in production and other factors was insurmountable for private laborers to be able to
adequately compete.97
Washington State: Microjet and Talon Industries
An additional well-documented case is that of Microjet and Talon Industries in
Washington state. Microjet Industries (a water jet cutting business) was able to contract with
Washington Correctional Facilities and ultimately gained “free access to a 56,000 square foot
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industrial space, built specifically for private prison industries.”98 Being the only water jet
company that had such a contract, Microjet was able to create somewhat of a monopoly, earning
many of the contracts previously held by other companies.99 Talon industries was one such
competitor company affected, and it eventually had to close down operations.100 Rick Trelstad,
the owner of Talon Industries said, “his company shut down in 1999 at least in part because
Microjet consistently underbid him for work.”101
In 2004, Talon Industries, along with other waterjet companies based in Washington state
decided to sue Washington State Correctional facilities: “They argued that Microjet’s free use of
a correctional facility’s space and access to cheap labor had given the company an unfair
advantage.”102 The court ultimately decided to rule in favor of the waterjet association, arguing
that the advertisement of “lower labor and overhead costs” created an unfair burden on other
companies to compete effectively.103 The court cited three arguments that the founders of
Washington State had originally made against private prison labor: “...fears over the unfair
competition to free labor, the conditions of brutality for inmates, and the possible corruption and
favoritism [towards certain private interests] associated with private convict labor.”104 This was a
highly significant court decision which decided that private contracting within prisons in this
manner was unconstitutional state wide.105 However, public reactions to this ruling were highly
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negative, mostly due to state prison chief Joe Lehman’s public statements about loss of state
revenues: “He estimated an annual loss of $600,000 for covering incarceration costs for the
inmates, and a loss of up to $150,000 for victims’ funds.”106 The accuracy of these figures is not
widely known, and some authors, including Susan Kang, believe them to be “garnished” in some
way, likely from comparing worker wages to those of non-incarcerated workers.107 Nevertheless,
the fear of such significant financial losses to tax payers was enough for the public to vote the
private use of prison labor into a constitutional amendment through a ballot initiative in 2007.108
As Susan Kang argues, this vote demonstrated that the public, politicians, and private interests
valued profits and “punishment over protecting vulnerable workers.”109
Texas, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Beyond
There are numerous examples that are not documented well enough to stand on their
own, only to be found in one paragraph descriptions in news articles and other popular sources.
These are not highly verified, and generally stem from the testimony of one or two individuals
impacted by a company’s prison labor contracting. These are examples that do not have easily
accessible court or agency proceedings, or whose effects never resulted in legal consequences. It
can be extrapolated from Gordon Lafer’s work on wage precarity that in many cases individuals
or small companies simply do not have the resources to file official complaints against job and
contract losses.110 These case studies on their own do not yield substantive qualitative data from
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which one could extrapolate an argument, however, combined they do make a compelling case
for the scale of worker displacement from prison labor across the United States.
One of the more popularized in media cases is that of Boeing Corporation in Washington
State. Boeing is no stranger to labor controversy, and its prison labor controversy in the late 90s
is no different. In an effort to save costs, Boeing relocated two Seattle factories: one to China and
one to the Washington State Reformatory.111 According to one author, conditions were not
terribly different in the two new factories:
Employees live right next to the factory premises. They are forbidden to form any type of
trade union, much less an independent one. For those who step out of line on the shop
floors of Washington prisons, there is the notorious Intensive Management Unit of
‘reeducation through sensory deprivation’ fame112
Ultimately, this case demonstrates that factories are not unlike forced labor that many Americans
often criticize: workers are stripped of association rights, forced to act in strict and particular
ways, and must live near their places of work until they become all consumed by the labor they
perform. Furthermore, individuals are punished in cruel ways such as solitary confinement for
any misstep or failure to perform, likening this instance of prison labor to examples Americans
often construct as purely an overseas phenomenon. Beyond this, the shuttering of two factories
only to have one be relocated in China demonstrates that similarly to offshoring, companies do
seek increased profit margins by outsourcing labor to areas where they can pay lower wages and
provide less benefits.113
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Another example is that of Lockhart Technologies in Austin, Texas. Upon contracting
with Lockhart Correctional Facilities, the company decided to close its plant in Austin, laying off
130 circuit board assembly workers.114 Lockhart Technologies made this decision after being
presented with an offer to have inmates perform work in “a state-subsidized facility on prison
grounds for which the company paid just one dollar in rent per year.”115 Lockhart additionally
was able to pay inmates minimum wage (often less, realistically, after legalized restitution based
wage skimming) and offer no benefits or workman’s compensation, as opposed to the more than
$10 an hour plus benefits those 130 non-incarcerated laborers were making previously.116
The state of Oregon is also wrought with hundreds of examples of prison labor detracting
from free market labor. Much of this stems from Oregon’s mandatory prison labor law.117 This
mandate from 1994 states that all prisoners should work 40 hour weeks, and encourages
correctional facilities to market their labor force to private industries.118 As a result, many
administrative public servant type jobs are now being filled by prisoners in Oregon state such as
data entry and record keeping.119 However, this mandate has displaced numerous nonincarcerated workers. In one study, it was found that one hundred construction workers lost their
jobs when Umatilla prison decided to hire inmates instead.120 This is just one of many examples
from after the law was adopted:
...thousands of public sector jobs [had] been taken over by prisoners; workers in the
private sector [had] been laid off when their firms lost contracts to prison based
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industries; and with the cost of supervising a full-time work force, the state for the first
time in its history [was] spending more on corrections than on higher education.121
This scope of this mandate, unfortunately, has not been fully explored in aggregate studies, and
the true extent of public and private sector job losses not confirmed. However, simply based on
individual reporting and correctional spending increases as discussed above, one can get a pretty
good picture of the extent of prison labor displacing jobs in the state of Oregon.
There are infinitely more small and lightly documented cases in existence across the
country. The same author who discusses Lockhart and Boeing attempts to put the frequency of
these cases into perspective:
In recent years, an Ohio supplier of Honda automobile parts paid inmates two dollars per
hour to perform the same work unionized free workers had done for twenty to thirty
dollars per hour; an Arizona company closed its unionized slaughterhouse to open a
prison operation at much lower cost; and in 1997, within one year of opening a
production facility in a Wisconsin prison, the Fabry Glove and Mitten Company’s inmate
workforce, paid $5.25 per hour, had grown to 100 while its “free labor force,” paid $11
per hour, had shrunk from 205 to 120. Prison labor is not just a prisoner issue.122
These wage discrepancies are significant, and can represent both great increases in profits for
businesses, as well as huge job losses for non-incarcerated workers. Differences of up to $28 an
hour as documented here can greatly increase production yields as well as profit margins. Even if
non-incarcerated laborers are willing to work for minimum wage, prison labor still has a clear
competitive advantage as state and federal mandated minimum wages for prisoners are small or
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non-existent. This disadvantages low income workers who are not incarcerated and who have to
make the federally mandated minimum wage; this was the case in a Georgia recycling plant
where 50 employees were laid off after their company contracted prison labor.123 35 of the 50
employees who were laid off had taken their current positions in order to get off of welfare, and
many of them promptly had to go back on it after losing their jobs.124 The private sector is also
acutely aware of the advantages contractors have when they work with prisoners instead of nonincarcerated workers. In one case, Lizer Lawn Care in Wisconsin lost a $13,000 contract with the
state to cut the lawn at the Sheriff’s Office.125 However, the owner of that company seemed to
have some level of understanding for the state’s ending of his contract, saying: “Obviously we’d
like the work, but I know just like any other business, if there’s a chance of saving money, it
would be a smart business move.”126 The common doctrine of free market competition seems to
have influenced this business owner’s belief, likely because he lost a contract, and not his
business to prison labor. However, there is no doubt that for many private and public companies,
contracting with prisoners is the cheaper, more logical solution as it saves money and allows for
higher profit margins.
Conclusions
These cases taken together, do not necessarily paint a picture of a wide sweeping
pandemic of job loss in ways that narratives like offshoring or immigration do. However, the
scale of these instances of worker precarity being exacerbated by prison labor is not small. Cases
such as 20 up to even 100 workers losing their jobs, especially in areas that are already painted
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as economically struggling, simply do not get the news coverage that massive relocations of
huge industrial facilities overseas do. Consequently, this may be painted as a seemingly nonissue, an effect that is potentially no different than other shocks to the free market such as baby
boomers retiring as one author posits.127 However, there are real tangible effects, and prison
labor has grown substantially, even in the times since these case studies occurred.128 These
effects may not seem substantial in the aggregate, but in terms of increased profits from private
prisons, and numbers of low wage employees who have lost their jobs, they are. These effects
need to be studied in the aggregate, and eventually at a nation-wide level, but for now these case
studies demonstrate well the mechanisms by which prison labor has contributed to precarity.
Analysis: How Did We Get Here?
From case study analysis, it is clear that companies with the means are likely to use prison
labor in order to cut costs, production time, and to compete more effectively. However, in many
cases this decision to capitalize on prison labor is as a response to economic pressures. This
pressure comes from an ever changing economic landscape with revenue losses and market
volatility becoming ever more common. Simultaneously, incarceration rates continue to increase
(albeit at a slower pace than in the 1980s and 90s) maintaining a large, captive, labor pool.129 In a
world of prevalent offshoring and public pressure to keep jobs domestic and repatriate labor,
prison labor is an opportunity for companies to politically and economically benefit.130 However,
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this repatriation does not follow common narratives of giving Americans “back their jobs” and
rather further entrenches the cyclical poverty many low wage non incarcerated workers face.
Understanding How Private Prison Labor Promotes Itself Politically
In order to prescribe policy solutions to private prisons encroachment on the labor market,
it is important to understand the ways in which private prison labor and the prison industrial
complex as a whole has propagated itself over time. Politically, private prison labor has been
able to bolster itself through the same mechanisms that bolster other means of government
corruption: lobbying, large scale campaign contributions, revolving doors, purchased policy
drafting, and a general lack of public awareness. In terms of lobbying, there is substantial
evidence that corporations spend millions of dollars in order to lobby the government to advance
policies and actions that decrease barriers to prison labor. The GEO Group and CoreCivic, two
large private prison corporations, spent over five million dollars in 2016 alone lobbying the
federal government.131 While these corporations say that they will not lobby for any laws or
policies that would affect individuals and the conditions of their incarceration, they do lobby for
longer sentences and increased government funding.132 Campaign contributions also play a big
role, with one study identifying 3,100 corporations with private prison labor interests or
connections donating over $175 million in state and federal elections in 2016.133 It is also
important to note that the officials themselves receiving these campaign contributions may
themselves be former corrections officials or have business experience in private prison
corporations. There have been several instances of top corrections officials leaving their jobs at

131
Arabella Advisors. “Understanding and Confronting the Prison-Industrial Complex: An Overview for
Philanthropists,” 2018: 12-13.
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid.

35
GEO Group and then going to be in decision making positions at prisons or government
administration positions pertaining to prison labor.134
However, one of the most insidious instances of political mechanisms being used to
advance private prison labor instances is that of policy foundations being paid by private prison
corporations to draft policies that are beneficial to the industry. One example is the policy group
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which had investment connections to the
Corrections Corporation of America and the American Bail Coalition when it drafted and
lobbied for policy increasing sentencing severity and duration in dozens of states in the 1990s.135
Collectively, these political mechanisms make it possible for private prison corporations to
create widespread policy changes that benefit their companies and bottom lines. Individuals,
especially those affected by the wage precarity these corporations, may be causing through their
use of prison labor (as well as prisoners themselves) do not have the “political muscle” necessary
in order to sway policy in a direction which may benefit them.136 Public opinion is also not on
their side in order to help bolster their political fight, as there is a general shroud of secrecy over
the use of prison labor. Supply chains, degree of use, and which politicians support and are
financially backed by prison labor are all remarkably difficult to ascertain.137 This contributes to
a lack of understanding of the problem, as well as a lack of any political will to stop the
prevalence of private prison labor. This lack of public outrage prohibits any sort of collectivized
national or international response to the issue as a whole.
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Public Outrage, Ignorance, and Paths Forward
However, this lack of political power is not to say that there is no hope surrounding this
issue. Many studies have shown that there is substantial concern over prison labor and
incarceration in America in general across “all political parties, regions, age, gender, and
racial/ethnic groups,” making it one of few instances where nearly everyone can agree on a
political issue.138 Research also shows that some individuals are concerned over connections they
see between mass incarceration being used to fuel labor for private companies and forced labor
in other countries as well as America’s own history with slave labor.139 However, this particular
concern is not more widespread due to the lack of awareness or day to day visibility of private
prison labor. Supply chains are often obscured, consumers do not directly interact or know they
are directly interacting with prisoners, and there are no laws requiring products produced by
prisoners to be labeled as such. Many scholars also argue that there is a sort of reluctance to look
critically at our society in many ways, but notably in the area of prison labor. Angela Davis
writes: “there is reluctance to face the realities hidden within them, a fear of thinking about what
happens inside them. Thus, the prison is present in our lives and, at the same time, it is absent
from our lives.”140
The prison is a taboo, and yet, especially with the growth of prison labor, is an institution
that is present in some capacity in everyone’s lives. However, when prison labor is brought to the
surface and to the public’s attention, there is generally outrage that is difficult for some
companies to shake. This can be seen in the fact that Victoria’s Secret is still associated with
prison labor from utilizing women’s prisons to sew undergarments in the 1990s, or in the case of
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Whole Foods using prison farms for produce which caused outrage in 2015.141 These factors are
all important as they create potentials for future interventions or actions that may have public and
individual backing. To individual’s core sense of fairness, concern for human rights, and
businesses’ understanding of public perception and potential decreased profitability, there are
clear reasons to publicly speak out against prison labor. However, if actions are not taken to
bring this problem out of obscurity, there may be little that can be done to stop public
indifference and ignorance.
Potential Solutions
There are many potential solutions to the negative effects of private prison labor which can
be taken by the private sector itself. The most obvious solution on the part of the consumer or
individual company, is simply to stop purchasing and supporting organizations that profit from
prison labor that has been shown to have negative human rights or non-incarcerated labor
precarity consequences. Boycotts, divestment, and supply chain interference can all be useful
tools in forcing corporations to stop their utilization of private prison labor. They are also among
the only tools that are sometimes viable for individuals without substantial power or financial
influence to utilize. However, supply chains are not always as cut an dry as they are in cases of
direct contracting, as was true in the cases of Tennier and Talon Industries. Supply chains are
often obscured, with companies themselves not always knowing that inputs were produced by
prisoners. Goodridge provides a good example of how this could realistically manifest, outlining
how potatoes that were once harvested by prisoners could be sent to a manufacturer that makes
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potato starch from them which then is sold to a distributor and put into a final item as an
ingredient that is sold in stores by a final company.142
This is not an excuse for the lack of understanding of where inputs are sourced from, as it
is the responsibility of companies to do their due diligence. However, companies with values that
espouse equality and opportunity may unknowingly find themselves contributing to a system that
hurts economically disadvantaged individuals and promoted increased incarceration and
recidivism rates.143 These multiple levels of distance away from the original act of labor itself are
not uncommon in today’s world, with cases of forced and slave labor abroad often manifesting in
similar ways (think Nike and Apple labor scandals). However, there is an argument to be made
that such labor practices should be substantially less opaque, allowing for consumers and
businesses alike to have better understandings of where their products and inputs come from in
order to more adequately inform their choices.
Policy Recommendations
Given all of these considerations there are some clear policy routes that could be pursued
in order to make inroads towards less corrupt and harmful private prison labor practices. For one,
state level databases (mirroring existing federal databases) could be mandated, forcing state level
prison operations to disclose which companies are utilizing prisoner’s labor, thereby illuminating
supply chains for consumers. A similar step could be taken on the part of corporations views of
their own supply chains, with potential laws outlining disclosure requirements for producers of
inputs likely having a similar effect on making the supply chain less opaque. Oversight is also
strongly needed in both federal and state level private prisons alike. This is a key area where the
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United States is in violation of international law, and by implementing higher standards of
oversight, the human rights violations and severe undercutting of markets could be curtailed. On
that note, a comprehensive policy delineating inmate minimum wages in state level institutions
could be monumental in reducing the wage precarity and forced labor impacts of private prison
labor. In a system where inmates make wages that are non-existent or insignificant, there would
not be nearly as many opportunities to exploit prisoner’s labor and undercut private markets.
Furthermore, campaign finance reforms, as well as regulations on lobbying could have an impact
on how powerful companies are able to consolidate power and influence in the prisons they
operate. As one final policy recommendation, the public and the International Labor
Organization itself could place increased pressure on the United States to not only follow and
abide by, but to ratify Convention 29 on forced labor. The United States has refused to do so, and
there have not been substantial pressures from the public or international community to make
this change happen. Larger than but also intrinsic to any policy recommendation’s impact is
public support and political and economic pressure placed on politicians and corporations.
Exploratory Conclusions
The largest barrier, and one of the reasons for the existence of this thesis, however, is the
utter lack of publicly available data or research that has been done on private prison labor and its
impacts. There are potentially thousands of corporations within the United States that directly
benefit from the prison industrial complex as a whole and more specifically prison labor. What is
not known is who these companies are, to what extent prison labor benefits them, how many jobs
are lost to prison labor in the aggregate, prison labor’s effects on offshoring and repatriating
labor, and dozens more questions. Even finding what reliable data on what wages are for
prisoners in private institutions is nearly impossible today. Substantial future research is
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necessary in order to establish the degree and scope of the problems private prison labor may
cause, not only in terms of labor precarity, but human rights, psychological impact on prisoners,
environmental degradation, effects on recidivism rates, and many, many other areas of potential
impact. In order to adequately form any effective policy response, there must be some degree of
effort made in producing future aggregate studies on the impacts that prison labor has on the
United States political and economic realities as a whole. Absent that, smaller questions, such as
the extent to which labor precarity is caused by private prison labor, will likely never be
answered fully. This paper successfully offers a baseline evaluation of private prison labor’s
effects on wage precarity, finding that to a measurable extent private prison labor contributes to
wage precarity. With future substantial research, changes to this reality through both public and
political pressures may eventually prove successful.
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